

# **The Cartel or the Collapse? Analyzing Intentional Market Control and the Decline of Independent Film Profitability (1990–2024)**

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# The Cartel or the Collapse? Analyzing Intentional Market Control and the Decline of Independent Film Profitability (1990–2024)

## I. Executive Summary of Findings and Conclusion on the Hypothesis

The central research objective was to assess the hypothesis that the historically low profitability and subsequent decline in payment for independent film is primarily attributable not to passive market failure (e.g., the collapse of physical media), but rather to intentional market control exercised by major studios and media conglomerates through legal, structural, and contractual mechanisms from 1990 to the present.

The analysis provides substantial evidentiary support for the hypothesis of intentional market control. While the economic shift caused by the collapse of the DVD market reduced the overall revenue pool available for Minimum Guarantees (MGs), this market reaction served primarily to intensify the effectiveness of pre-existing and newly developed structural controls designed to suppress independent profitability and restrict market access. Key findings trace a deliberate 30-year strategy of vertical integration, legal manipulation, and contractual abuse.

Specifically, the ability of vertically integrated streaming giants to foreclose content <sup>1</sup>, the systematic legal reintroduction of monopolistic exhibition practices following the 2020 termination of the *Paramount Consent Decrees* <sup>2</sup>, and the continuous use of "Hollywood Accounting" to define "net profit" out of existence regardless of box office success <sup>4</sup> confirm that low independent film profitability is a structural certainty built into the industry model, rather than a symptom of reactive market weakness. The evidence indicates that the decline in payment for independent film is an intentional part of the dominant cartel's control strategy.

## **II. The New Vertical Integration: Major Studio Consolidation of Independent Distribution (1990–2010s)**

The period between 1990 and the early 2010s established the corporate foundation required for modern market control, characterized by a rapid phase of media conglomerate formation and the strategic co-option of previously competitive independent entities.

### **A. Mapping Conglomerate Formation (1990–1995)**

The early 1990s witnessed profound horizontal and vertical mergers that concentrated immense financial and distribution power among a shrinking group of major players. In January 1990, Warner Communications merged with Time Inc. to form Time Warner <sup>5</sup>, a transaction later followed by the acquisition of Ted Turner's Turner Broadcasting System (TBS), securing extensive cable TV stations and a large film library.<sup>6</sup> Later that year, Matsushita Electric acquired MCA/Universal, which was eventually renamed Universal Studios.<sup>5</sup> By 1991, Columbia Pictures Entertainment was renamed Sony Pictures Entertainment.<sup>5</sup>

Perhaps the most definitive move demonstrating the strategic focus on distribution control occurred in 1995 when The Walt Disney Company acquired Capital Cities/ABC for \$19 billion.<sup>7</sup> This was a critical step in establishing long-term dominance. Disney absorbed the major television network ABC, prominent sports cable channels ESPN/ESPN2, and stakes in Lifetime Television and A&E Networks.<sup>7</sup> This maneuver significantly enhanced distribution capabilities, underscoring the corporate strategy that while content creation was essential, control over the distribution pipeline was the ultimate key to market control and sustained profitability for the conglomerate.<sup>7</sup> This focus confirms the analytical premise that control over audience access is central to the majors' long-term strategy.

### **B. The Acquisition Strategy: Institutionalizing the 'Independent' Sector**

To neutralize competition and integrate innovative content, major studios systematically acquired leading independent distribution entities, effectively moving their primary competitor inside the cartel structure.

The most prominent example of this corporate assimilation was The Walt Disney Company's

acquisition of Miramax Films on June 30, 1993.<sup>8</sup> Miramax, known for acclaimed independent productions like *Pulp Fiction* and *The Crying Game*<sup>7</sup>, was purchased for a reported \$60 million.<sup>7</sup> Although founders Bob and Harvey Weinstein initially retained creative independence and gained access to Disney's financial resources<sup>7</sup>, the strategic importance of this move lay in co-opting a successful distribution channel that operated outside the traditional studio system.

By the end of the 1990s, the process was standardized: most major studios had formed specialty film divisions (such as Fox Searchlight, Focus Features, etc.) dedicated to making films with "artistic, edgy, or 'serious' social issues or themes".<sup>6</sup> This practice served to institutionalize the independent ecosystem. Before these acquisitions, the independent film sector represented genuine market competition and artistic risk-taking. Once integrated, the independent content stream was funneled into the conglomerate's overall vertical structure, ensuring that innovative and successful intellectual property (IP) ultimately fed the majors' coffers. The former rivals were now subject to the "same concerns and corporate worries that traditional Hollywood studios had always confronted".<sup>6</sup> This co-option strategy systematically diluted true outside competitive pressure, establishing structural control over the flow of talent and specialized content.

### III. Legal Mechanisms of Foreclosure: The Legacy and Repeal of the Paramount Decrees

The most compelling legal evidence supporting the hypothesis of intentional market control stems from the regulatory environment governing film exhibition, particularly the reversal of a landmark antitrust ruling intended to foster competition.

#### A. The Original Mandate and its Impact on Competition

The 1948 Supreme Court decision in *U.S. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.*, commonly referred to as the Paramount Decrees, represented the culmination of an antitrust suit filed by the Justice Department against the five dominant studios of the time (RKO, Warner Bros., Paramount, Loew's, and Twentieth Century-Fox).<sup>9</sup> These studios controlled a massive share of first-run theaters and used monopolistic practices to stifle competition.<sup>9</sup>

The ruling targeted practices stemming from the majors' vertical integration of production, distribution, and exhibition. Two key prohibited practices were **block-booking** (forcing exhibitors to purchase a block of films, including mediocre "B films," to secure access to a desired major motion picture) and **circuit dealing** (licensing a film to all affiliated theaters

simultaneously).<sup>9</sup> These practices created an immense barrier for smaller and independent studios, denying them access to critical first-run screening opportunities.<sup>10</sup> The decision compelled the studios to divest their theater holdings and permanently cease these practices.<sup>9</sup> This dismantling of vertical integration empowered independent production and distribution, encouraging creativity and autonomy in theater programming, and thereby laying the groundwork for the diversity that characterized the latter half of the 20th century cinema landscape.<sup>12</sup>

## **B. The 2020 Repeal and the Reintroduction of Vertical Risk**

In 2020, the Department of Justice (DOJ) successfully petitioned to terminate the Paramount Decrees, arguing that technological changes and the rise of new media distribution methods had rendered the 1940s-era rules obsolete.<sup>10</sup> This termination is identified as the single most significant structural development supporting the market control hypothesis.

Following the DOJ decision, the Southern District imposed a two-year sunset period on restrictions such as block booking, which expired around 2022/2024.<sup>3</sup> As of 2024, traditional movie studios and streaming services possess "full freedom to engage in a host of production, distribution, and exhibition strategies not seen in the entertainment industry since the 1940s".<sup>3</sup> Legal scholars immediately noted that this repeal would dramatically limit the distribution channels, creative control, and marketing opportunities available to independent filmmakers.<sup>2</sup>

The return of practices like block-booking gives the cartel a specific, intentional mechanism for market foreclosure. Block booking empowers major distributors to push weak content onto exhibitors.<sup>11</sup> For independent theaters, especially those with few screens, the opportunity cost of dedicating a screen to a studio-mandated "B film" is economically devastating, as it unfairly keeps rival content—specifically, independent films—off the screen.<sup>11</sup> Therefore, the difficulties in securing theatrical exhibition for independent cinema are not a passive failure of the market to accept certain content, but a structural consequence of legal changes secured by the dominant studios, granting them the right to deny screen time to competitors.

The repeal also ignored the emergent threat posed by vertically integrated streaming giants. The courts acknowledged that new competitors like Netflix, Disney, and Amazon were not subject to the original decrees.<sup>14</sup> These new entities are now exhibiting content they produce, creating a digital parallel to the original problem. Vertically integrated streamers are incentivized to engage in content "foreclosure," wherein they reserve exclusive content for their own platforms, mirroring the anti-competitive behavior of the original Paramount

defendants.<sup>1</sup> The repeal effectively legalized the re-monopolization of exhibition in the digital era, making the cartel's control over distribution channels even tighter than the original 1940s structure.<sup>14</sup>

## **IV. Contractual Instruments of Profit Elimination: Hollywood Accounting and Net Profit Abuse**

Beyond structural and legal foreclosure, the hypothesis of intentional control is cemented by the contractual mechanisms designed to eliminate residual financial return for independent creators, a practice widely known as "Hollywood Accounting." This practice ensures that even commercially successful films report financial losses, thereby directly substantiating the claim that low profitability is intentional.

### **A. Systemic Flaws in "Net Profit" Definitions**

Hollywood Accounting utilizes contractually-based practices specifically designed to reduce revenues and inflate costs, often disregarding Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).<sup>4</sup> Studios developed these accounting methods and contractual definitions to ensure that once all deductions—including distribution fees, overhead, and interest—were applied to the gross profits, "there was not much left to distribute to the profit participants".<sup>4</sup> The objective is to define "net profit" out of existence, thereby ensuring that participants owed backend compensation receive nothing.<sup>4</sup> Consequently, in the vast majority of cases involving net profit definitions, the reported net profit is less than zero.<sup>4</sup>

This contractual deception makes low profitability a premeditated certainty. Independent filmmakers bear the primary financial risk of production.<sup>15</sup> When they seek distribution, their relative bargaining power is low, often compelling them to accept contracts with these disadvantageous "net profit" clauses. The studio, typically assuming no risk since it screens the completed film before acquisition, retains 100 percent of the upside while using the accounting structure to guarantee that the producer who risked the project receives no back-end return.<sup>15</sup>

### **B. Evidentiary Case Studies of Success Reporting Loss**

The systematic nature of profit elimination is demonstrated by numerous high-grossing films that officially reported massive financial losses. This evidence directly refutes the notion that low profitability is merely a function of market failure or poor commercial performance.

Notable examples of films that generated substantial gross revenue but reported zero or negative net profit include:

- *My Big Fat Greek Wedding*, an independent success that cost \$6 million, made over \$350 million at the box office, yet reportedly showed a loss of \$20 million.<sup>4</sup>
- *Forrest Gump*, which earned \$667 million worldwide, yet reported a \$31 million loss.<sup>4</sup>
- *Batman*, which grossed \$411 million worldwide, yet reported a \$36 million deficit.<sup>4</sup>
- *Coming to America*, which made \$288 million in revenue but reported no profit, leading to a landmark lawsuit against Paramount that exposed the practice of hiding profits.<sup>4</sup>

The existence of these financial outcomes proves that even if an independent film breaks through and achieves massive commercial success, the embedded accounting system is designed to nullify the financial participation of independent parties.

### **C. The Mechanism of Vertical Self-Dealing**

Vertical integration exacerbates Hollywood Accounting by facilitating "self-dealing," which allows conglomerates to inflate internal costs.<sup>4</sup> A studio's distribution arm, for instance, may charge excessive fees (often 30–40% of the gross) to the production entity, even though both are owned by the same parent corporation. These inflated distribution costs and overhead deductions drive down the already vulnerable "net profit" base from which independent participants are owed payment. This mechanism, combined with the zero-profit definitions, ensures that the independent creator's long-term remuneration is permanently suppressed, regardless of commercial triumph. The consequence is a systemic devaluation of the independent creator's intellectual property (IP) rights, limiting their ability to build sustained wealth and leverage future projects outside the cartel structure.<sup>4</sup>

## **V. Distribution Control in the Digital Age: Streaming Platforms as the Modern Cartel**

The transition from physical media and theatrical dominance to digital streaming has introduced new forms of intentional control, leveraging the market shift to secure IP ownership and influence content flow.

### **A. The Global Rights Trap and the MG Decline**

Streaming platforms (SVOD/VOD) have fundamentally altered the independent film financing model. They often act as major financiers, providing production budgets comparable to major studios and offering large, safe upfront payments (Minimum Guarantees or advances) that are appealing compared to the high risk of traditional theatrical releases.<sup>18</sup>

However, this financing comes with a critical contractual demand: the acquisition of exclusive, worldwide Intellectual Property (IP) rights. Streaming services, particularly those focusing on original programming, aggressively seek full ownership of global distribution rights.<sup>10</sup> Most SVOD deals are explicitly exclusive and subject to long terms.<sup>20</sup>

This intentional demand for "all rights, worldwide" fundamentally destroys the traditional independent film economy, which relied on the staggered monetization of rights across multiple territories and media windows (theatrical, international pre-sales, regional TV, DVD).<sup>21</sup> The dominance of streamers has caused the financial contribution of traditional pre-sales to dwindle significantly, falling from an estimated 50 percent of the production budget to approximately 20 percent.<sup>22</sup> By eliminating the filmmaker's ability to create revenue streams outside the initial buyout, the major streamers—many of which are vertically integrated extensions of the traditional studios—intentionally cap the maximum financial return for the independent creator. The independent filmmaker is effectively transformed from an IP owner who licenses rights into a work-for-hire vendor who receives a one-time fee, ensuring the conglomerate retains all future monetization potential.

## **B. Foreclosure and Algorithmic Gatekeeping**

The integration of streaming into the conglomerate structure has reintroduced content foreclosure. Vertically integrated streamers, such as Disney and Paramount, are incentivized to reserve exclusive content for their own platforms, actively "foreclosing" that content from competitors, mirroring the classic antitrust concerns that spurred the original Paramount Decrees.<sup>1</sup>

Furthermore, the mechanisms of audience access are subject to structural manipulation through algorithmic bias. Streaming platforms increasingly rely on data and algorithms to determine which content they finance, promote, and prioritize.<sup>18</sup> This dependence creates a systemic pressure toward homogeneity, favoring formulaic content that appeals to the broadest possible audience.<sup>18</sup> Independent films, particularly those focused on political, character-driven, or social issue themes, struggle to find their audience in this environment, as the algorithm prioritizes sensational true crime or celebrity-driven content.<sup>23</sup> This subtle but powerful intentional control shifts from overt contractual suppression to structural manipulation of audience pathways, ensuring that the cartel dictates both what is funded and

what is prominently viewed.

## **VI. The Reactive Counter-Hypothesis Assessment: Does Market Failure Sufficiently Explain the Problem?**

A critical assessment requires balancing the evidence of intentional control against the economic factors often cited as primary causes for low independent film profitability: market failure.

### **A. The Death of the DVD Market**

The collapse of the DVD and physical media market, driven by the shift to streaming, undeniably removed a crucial financial safety net for Hollywood.<sup>24</sup> Historically, robust DVD sales could offset weak theatrical performance, allowing studios to finance riskier, more diverse projects.<sup>25</sup> The decline of this high-margin secondary revenue stream directly caused stagnating revenues for the independent film sector globally<sup>26</sup> and necessitated radical adjustments in traditional financing models.<sup>22</sup> This reduction in ancillary revenue is a legitimate reactive market consequence that lowered the baseline financial resources available for Minimum Guarantees (MGs) and advances.

### **B. Content Glut and Audience Fragmentation**

The contemporary media environment is marked by an abundance of content and diverse entertainment options, contributing to declining theatrical attendance.<sup>27</sup> This content glut makes it difficult for unique independent films to capture audience attention, especially when they compete against the high volume of formulaic or sensational content prioritized by major platforms.<sup>23</sup> Furthermore, success in attracting major inward investment for high-budget blockbusters, often facilitated by the studios, raises production costs, making access to cast, crew, and studio space more expensive for genuinely independent producers.<sup>26</sup>

### **C. Correlation Analysis: Intentional Control vs. Reactive Shift**

While the reactive market shifts—the DVD collapse and rising costs—undoubtedly reduced the pool of available capital and increased competitive pressure, they do not sufficiently explain the *low profitability* of independent films.

The distinction lies between the *initial advance* (MG) and the *ultimate profit realization*. The DVD collapse lowered the amount of the initial MG that a studio or streamer was willing to risk. However, the intentional mechanisms of Hollywood Accounting and Global Rights Buyouts guaranteed that the back-end profit would be eliminated regardless of the film's gross success.

The low profitability is not a *reaction* to the DVD market collapse; it is an *intentional contractual guarantee* that predates the collapse and persists in the digital era. The market collapse primarily lowered the financial baseline, intensifying the desperation of independent filmmakers and increasing their vulnerability to accepting exploitative contracts (low MGs combined with zero-profit definitions) that the established cartel was already structured to enforce.

Thus, the majors contribute to cost inflation (by attracting massive inward investment that drives up labor and infrastructure prices) <sup>26</sup> while simultaneously utilizing structural and contractual means (Paramount repeal, Hollywood Accounting, global rights demands) to ensure independents cannot recoup those costs or access sufficient revenue streams. This creates a "perfect storm" that actively squeezes the independent sector from both ends, confirming the primary role of intentional control.

## **VII. Conclusion: Correlating Market Control with Independent Film Devaluation**

The synthesis of corporate, legal, and contractual evidence spanning three decades strongly confirms the hypothesis that the low profitability and diminished payment for independent film result from intentional, active market control by dominant conglomerates, rather than passive market failure. The data identifies specific mechanisms deployed by the cartel to restrict access and eliminate profit.

### **A. Synthesis: The Weight of Evidence**

The evidence strongly shifts the explanation for low independent film profitability from passive market failure to active, intentional market control. The timeline demonstrates a strategic shift from co-opting content (1990s acquisitions) to controlling pipelines (1995 distribution acquisitions) and finally to legalizing competitive restrictions (2020 repeal). This chain of evidence proves the intentional, escalating nature of market control.

Table 1: Major Studio Consolidation and Control of Independent Film Distribution (1990–2024)

Time Period	Major Studio/Conglomerate Action	Acquired/Former Independent Division/Asset	Mechanism of Control/Impact	Source(s)
1990–1991	Time Inc. & Warner Comm. merge; Matsushita acquires MCA/Universal; Sony Pictures named.	N/A (Parent Company Consolidation)	Massive increase in conglomerate scale and financial power <sup>5</sup>	<sup>5</sup>
1993	Disney acquires Miramax Films.	Miramax Films	<b>Co-option:</b> Institutionalizes a leading independent competitor within the corporate cartel, subjecting its "edgy" content to corporate concerns.[6, 7]	[6, 7, 8]
1995	Disney acquires Capital Cities/ABC (\$19B).	ABC Network, ESPN	<b>Distribution Foreclosure:</b> Secures dominant distribution pipeline ("content was still king, but distribution would be the key"). <sup>7</sup>	<sup>7</sup>
Post-2015	Netflix, Amazon, Disney+ rapidly expand VOD presence.	Amazon MGM Studios, Netflix Original IP	<b>IP Foreclosure:</b> Demand for exclusive, worldwide IP ownership; transforms independents into work-for-hire vendors.[18, 10]	[18, 10]
2020	DOJ terminates Paramount	N/A (Regulatory Shift)	<b>Legal Foreclosure:</b>	<sup>2</sup>

	Consent Decrees.		Reintroduces risk of block-booking and vertical content foreclosure, reversing 70 years of antitrust protection.[2, 3, 10]	
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## B. Analysis of Intent: Structural Component of the Dominant Cartel

The low payment for independent film is not merely a symptom of external market volatility, but a structural component of the dominant business model designed for systemic risk mitigation and competitive elimination.

1. **Risk Mitigation via Exploitation:** By systematically employing Hollywood Accounting, the cartel maintains complete financial control, regardless of box office outcome. The financial risk is transferred entirely to the independent creator, while the potential for back-end profits is contractually neutralized.<sup>15</sup> This ensures the conglomerate retains all profits while bearing minimal financial risk in acquiring independent projects.
2. **Consolidation and Foreclosure:** The corporate timeline and the successful legal rollback of the Paramount Decrees grant the cartel explicit means to limit competitors' distribution pathways, both physically (theaters, via block-booking) and digitally (VOD pipelines, via content foreclosure).<sup>1</sup> This control ensures the cartel can dictate contractual terms, including low MGs and the insistence on IP forfeiture.

Table 2 provides a comparison of the causal factors and their respective impacts on independent financial viability.

Table 2: Causal Analysis: Intentional Market Control vs. Reactive Market Failure

Factor	Hypothesis Supported	Nature of Impact on Independent Payment/Profit	Causal Relationship to Low Profitability	Source(s)
Hollywood Accounting Practices	Intentional Market Control (Cartel)	Contractual elimination of net profit, regardless of gross success.	<b>Guaranteed Zeroing:</b> Ensures residuals and back-end payments are	<sup>4</sup>

			systematically withheld, making low profitability a premeditated certainty.	
Termination of Paramount Decrees	Intentional Market Control (Structural)	Legal ability to restrict distribution channels (exhibition).	<b>Access Denial:</b> Enables practices (block-booking) that prevent independent films from reaching audiences and generating competition-driven revenues.	[2, 11]
Demand for Exclusive Global Rights	Intentional Market Control (Distribution)	Elimination of regional pre-sales and future IP revenue streams.	<b>Value Capping:</b> Reduces the independent film from a diverse asset portfolio to a single, upfront payout, intentionally capping maximum financial return.	[18, 10]
Collapse of DVD/Ancillary Market	Reactive Market Response (External)	Decline in a high-margin secondary revenue source.	<b>Reduced Capital Pool:</b> Lowers the financial baseline used to calculate Minimum Guarantees (MGs) and advances.	[25, 26]
Rising Production Costs	Reactive Market Response (Internal)	Increased costs for cast, crew, and studio space.	<b>Margin Squeeze:</b> Exacerbates losses or reduces MGs, forcing greater reliance on cartel financing. <sup>26</sup>	<sup>26</sup>

## C. Final Determination on the Hypothesis

The decline in payment for independent film is overwhelmingly a function of intentional market control, exercised through defined legal, contractual, and structural means. The economic difficulty faced by independent filmmakers is not a simple misfortune resulting from technological change; it is the calculated outcome of a system designed to suppress competition, acquire valuable IP at reduced cost, and eliminate the contractual obligation to share residual profits. The low profitability of the sector is structurally mandated by the dominant cartel.

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